Emigrantes, desterrados, exiliados y opositores: La excepcionalidad de la política migratoria cubana.
por JUAN ANTONIO BLANCO, Ottawa
Muchos aceptan que hay una "diáspora" o "comunidad cubana asentada en el exterior", sin percatarse de que esa masa de personas se aproxima más a la figura del desterrado, que a la del emigrado de otros países. Al "exilio", por otra parte, se le identifica con los grupos de cubanos involucrados en actividades (pacíficas o violentas) contra el gobierno de la Isla, incluidos aquellos que, ejerciendo su libertad de expresión desde una nación extranjera, se limitan a hacer declaraciones públicas consideradas inconvenientes por el poder cubano.
Al aceptar acrítricamente estas definiciones, las personas corrientes suelen identificar a sus familiares como "emigrados" y les piden a menudo que no se metan en política, porque si actúan como "exiliados" (siempre según su errada definición del término) perderían la posibilidad de verlos en Cuba, o de que ellos puedan viajar a visitarlos en el exterior —y, eventualmente, quedarse fuera. Muchos creen también que el exiliado es solamente aquel que pide asilo político, por lo que no consideran como tales a quienes escapan de Cuba en balsa, o buscan otros modos de lograr salir y quedarse en el exterior.
Si partimos de esa manera de definir el concepto, vemos que, tanto en el caso cubano como en cualquier otro, hay exiliados (algunos por vía de asilo y otros no) que actúan como miembros activos de la oposición al gobierno de su país desde el exterior y otros que, una vez en el extranjero, se dedican a su vida privada exclusivamente.
Remesas, 'solidaridad' y servicios de inteligencia Es sobre ese exilio político activo, denominado por la propaganda oficial como "la mafia de Miami", que el gobierno cubano concentra todas sus baterías políticas y de inteligencia. Se trata, sin embargo, de un conjunto muy diverso y plural —hasta contradictorio— de personas y organizaciones con diferentes visiones de lo que creen debería ser la Cuba del futuro, aunque todos coincidan en la necesidad imperiosa de detener los abusos y violaciones de derechos humanos y democratizar el país.
Desde la crisis del Mariel, el gobierno cubano tuvo que admitir la progresiva flexibilización de las salidas temporales y definitivas de Cuba en las décadas de los ochenta y noventa. Antes de esa fecha, sólo los mayores de 65 años podían solicitar un permiso temporal para visitar a sus parientes, que era otorgado en raras ocasiones. A partir de entonces, el objetivo gubernamental ha sido neutralizar a la creciente masa de personas que abandonan el país, para que no se involucren en actividades políticas en el extranjero, y para que colaboren con las embajadas cubanas, una vez radicados allí.
En ese esfuerzo el gobierno cubano, por una parte, replantea el discurso oficial para presentar a quienes se marchan de Cuba como una masa de emigrados económicos, similar a la de otros países, que no son realmente opuestos a su política. Desde el éxodo masivo, plurirracial y pluriclasista, del Mariel, es este el modo de explicar internacionalmente el inocultable deseo masivo de salir de Cuba, a fin de que ese hecho no sea interpretado como señal de debilidad del consenso político interno.
Sin embargo, el trato entre represivo y hostil que se les dispensa a esas personas, desde que se conoce su deseo de marchar al extranjero y aún después de su relocalización, desmiente que se trate de una emigración normal.
Pierden sus empleos, se les intenta aislar socialmente, se les confiscan todas y cada una de sus propiedades (no sólo la casa, sino todo lo que está dentro de ella u otras propiedades que se conozca pertenezcan al potencial emigrado), se registra oficialmente en su pasaporte y documentos que se trata de una "salida definitiva del país"; al que, en lo adelante, sólo pueden —ocasionalmente y por limitado tiempo— retornar de visita, pero no para radicarse nuevamente en él. Pero, aun para acceder por tiempo limitado a su patria, esas personas siempre requieren que se les otorgue un "permiso de entrada", a pesar de tener pasaporte nacional vigente. Visitas selectivas En un reciente malabarismo mediático, el gobierno cubano anunció —como si ello fuese un gesto generoso, y no una obligación según los estándares internacionalmente vigentes y con la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos suscrita por Cuba desde 1948— que a partir de 2004 se suspende el requisito del permiso de entrada al país a todo aquel que tenga un pasaporte cubano en regla.
Lo que no dijo en público es que todo emigrado o exiliado aspirante a "visitar" su patria —porque todavía no podría radicarse o permanecer en la tierra donde nació más allá del limitado tiempo que se otorga a un visitante— tiene que primero pasar por el consulado correspondiente para que le estampen la inevitable autorización para tal visita, aunque ya no se cobre por ese humillante trámite.
Al igual que antes, queda en manos de oscuros funcionarios dilucidar si el caso de cualquier ciudadano que, radicado en otro país desea visitar su patria, se enmarca en una situación de ese corte. Ese proceso, además, transcurre dentro de la perenne opacidad del sistema que impide identificar quiénes decidieron dar la orden de poner o no el cuño final.
De llegarse a armar un escándalo internacional ante una negativa, el régimen goza de esa manera de la posibilidad de negar, de manera relativamente plausible, la responsabilidad directa de los funcionarios de nivel superior en relación con la decisión tomada y puede entonces, si así lo desea, declarar su disposición de "rectificar un error cometido por algún funcionario aislado de menor rango" para restaurar su imagen pública ante el hecho. En todo ese proceso, los ciudadanos de afuera y dentro de la Isla no tienen, sin embargo, el menor control o capacidad de monitoreo sobre el manejo de las decisiones migratorias de su patria.
Mientras que un chino, vietnamita, ruso, etiope, iraní, somalo, guatemalteco, argentino, mexicano o salvadoreño, puede vender sus propiedades para llegar con algún dinero a su nuevo país de asentamiento —o retornar al suyo si no se cumplen sus expectativas—, al ahora suavemente denominado "emigrado económico cubano" no se le reconocen esos derechos y se le somete a un régimen migratorio único en el mundo, equivalente al de un desterrado por vida.
Si Cuba insiste en sostener una política migratoria de naturaleza inadmisible y excepcional —salvo, quizás, la de Corea del Norte—, es comprensible y puede considerarse legítimo que EE UU mantenga para los emigrados cubanos hacia su territorio un régimen de acogida igualmente excepcional bajo la Ley de Ajuste Cubano.
Donde dice peligro
No pocas de esas personas —acostumbradas por décadas, antes de partir a su destierro, a creer que lo mejor es "resolver" los problemas personales y "no buscarse problemas"— terminan por aceptar su silencio, no se aproximan a organizaciones políticas cubanas en el exilio, o se expresan mal de ellas sin conocerlas, e incluso de los disidentes internos, en medios públicos. En algunas pocas ocasiones, aceptan también colaborar como informantes y agentes de las embajadas y consulados, contra otros emigrados desterrados, sean o no aquellos activos oposicionistas.
En esto prima el axioma de que el régimen cubano va a durar un tiempo todavía imprevisible, y mientras tanto tiene la capacidad de afectar negativamente a esos supuestos "emigrados" y sus familiares de diferentes modos, si se aproximan más de lo deseado a "los exiliados". Por ello, algunos de los familiares que dejaron en Cuba los exhortan a mantener la misma doble moral en el exterior que tenían antes en la Isla, a "no marcarse" negativamente con las embajadas a fin de "poder seguir resolviendo".
A los más leales y comprometidos emigrados-desterrados, o pasivos exiliados de ese otro sector integrado por colaboracionistas e informantes, se reparten de vez en cuando invitaciones a participar en supuestos "diálogos" de buena voluntad con el gobierno cubano. Estos diálogos no son sino otro show mediático donde una de las partes decide la agenda, selecciona a los invitados, realiza unilateralmente supuestas "consultas" y preside las reuniones, sin enfrentar el riesgo de algún cuestionamiento de valía —salvo en excepcionales ocasiones en que a los organizadores se les escapa un detalle a su control.
El gobierno de La Habana intenta desde hace varias décadas, y empleando para ello diversos mecanismos de chantaje, que la masa de virtuales desterrados cubanos en el exterior actúe en los países donde se radicaron, con la misma doble moral que hoy prevalece en la Isla, resultado de la vigencia prolongada del régimen político de vocación totalitaria que allí impera.
Si los exiliados desean que los cubanos en la Isla aprendan a decir "no" a las autoridades cuando los convocan a acciones de dudoso valor ético, entonces deben ellos mismos aprender a decir "no" cuando sus consulados y embajadas pretendan imponerles un silencio cómplice, manipular su conducta y limitar sus pacíficas acciones políticas en los países donde ahora residen. Y, a juicio de este autor, deberían acceder al diálogo sobre un conjunto de temas humanitarios inmediatos, pero exigiendo siempre con claridad meridiana y como condición sine qua non para su participación, que sea eso y no un circo. Si La Habana se empeñase en organizar nuevas reuniones con los ciudadanos cubanos radicados en el exterior del mismo modo autoritario con que lo ha hecho en el pasado, sería oportuno que los funcionarios encargados de conducir esos supuestos diálogos —algunos de ellos con suficiente experiencia profesional para conocer la diferencia entre lo que supone un diálogo genuino y lo que representa un espectáculo publicitario— encontrasen el modo de explicarle, diplomática y respetuosamente, a la cima del poder cubano, que "no se puede engañar a todo el mundo todo el tiempo".
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Emigrants, the banished, the exiled and the opposition: The exceptionalism of the politics of Cuban migration.
By: JUAN ANTONIO BLANCO, Ottawa Translated by: Adele Bagley Reprinted by permission of the author.
By uncritically accepting these definitions, ordinary people tend to identify their relatives as “emigrants” and often ask that they do not involve themselves in politics because if they act like “exiles” (always according to their erroneous definition of the term) they would lose the possibility of seeing them in Cuba, or of traveling to visit them outside of Cuba and eventually remaining abroad. Also, many believe that the exile is only he who asks for political asylum, not considering exiled those Cubans that escape on a raft or find other ways to leave Cuba and remain outside of the country.
What is certain is that the “Cuban community located abroad” as it is officially called, is, in reality, virtually banished and not simply emigrated for economic reasons. Neither is it true that the term exile need necessarily be linked (as many suppose) to only those persons granted asylum. Its exact definition is applicable to all that decide, generally, for political reasons, that it is not possible to bear the situation in their country and therefore opt to move to another place either through seeking political asylum or by emigrating.
If from here we try to define the concept, we shall see that, in the Cuban case just as any other, there are exiles (some who have been granted asylum and others who have not) that act as active members in opposition to the government of their country from abroad and others which, as soon as they are outside, dedicate themselves to their own private lives, exclusively.
The Diaspora, on the other hand, is a useful concept if the datum that one wishes to reflect is exclusively the degree of dispersion across the world of the Cuban population. However, the official use by the government of the Island serves the end of employing a neutral concept which is not associated with the causes which made it necessary for these people to abandon their country, nor does it explore the circumstances under which they left nor the conditions imposed in order for them to have physical access to their homeland.
One could say, then, that if the terms are used appropriately we would see that a Cuban Diaspora does exist made up of truly banished people, many of whom were exiles - some through asylum or political refuge and others who were not. From this mass of Cubans situated abroad in diverse ways and with diverse motives, it is a barely active and visible minority that truly acts in an organized way as a Cuban opposition (violently or peacefully) from abroad.
Remittances, ‘solidarity’ and intelligence services It is on those active political exiles, called the “ Miami mafia” by official propaganda that the Cuban government concentrates all of its political “batteries” and intelligence. They are, however, a plural and very diverse collection —to the point that it is contradictory— of persons and organizations with different visions of what they believe should be the Cuba of the future. Yet, all coincide in the imperitive need to stop the abuses and violations of human rights and to democratize the country.
The remainder is a vast conglomerate of persons that serve the Cuban power in obtaining its principal source of income of hard currency to the Island (family remittances) and occasionally to recruit agents that help their campaigns of "solidarity" and/or report on the activities of the exiled and politically active in tasks of opposition.
Since the Mariel crisis, the Cuban government had to allow the progressive flexibilization of both temporary and final exits from Cuba over the 1980’s and 1990’s. Before that date, only the portion of the population over 65 could request a temporary permission to visit to relatives, and that was offered only in rare occasions. Since then, the governmental objective has been to neutralize the growing mass of persons that abandon the country, so that they do not become involved in political activities abroad, and so that they cooperate with the Cuban embassies once situated there.
In that effort the Cuban government on the one hand has revisited official discussion presenting the idea that those that leave Cuba are emigrants for economic reasons, similar, in this way, to other countries and that in fact, those emigrants are not really opposed to Cuba’s politics. Since the pluri-racial and pluri-cultural massive exodus of Mariel, this is the way the government has chosen to explain internationally the unconcealible mass desire to leave Cuba so that this fact is not interpreted as a sign of weakness of internal political consensus. However, from the time their desire to leave Cuba and go abroad is known and even after their relocation, conduct between repressive and hostile is directed at these persons, which contradicts the idea that it is a normal emigration.
They lose their jobs, must endure attempts to be isolated socially, have all of their possessions confiscated (not only their home, but rather everything inside it as well and any other known property of the potential emigrant), and have it registered officially in their passport and documents that they have requested “final exit from the country”; to which, in the future, they can only—occasionally and for limited time—return to visit. They can not move back to Cuba. Yet, even to return to their home country for a limited period the emigrants must always be granted a “permission to enter” despite the fact that they have a valid national passport.
In a recent example of media juggling, the Cuban government announced —as if it were a generous gesture, and not an obligation according to the standards internationally in force with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights subscribed to by Cuba since 1948— that from 2004 the requirement of the permission of entrance is suspended into the country to all that that have a Cuban passport in order.
What was not said in public is that all emigrated or exiled persons who wish to “visit" their country —because they would not be able to remain in the land where they were born beyond the limited time that is offered to a visitor— must first go through the corresponding consulate so that they can stamp them with the inevitable authorization for such a visit, although the government no longer charges for that humiliating procedure.
The motives for refusing to offer that new way to authorize or to deny entrance to the country to each one of the millions of Cubans situated abroad —that neither the Spaniards nor the Irish applied to their fellow citizens, despite the extended terrorist action of ETA and the IRA— were described in vague terms to affirm that those “that have carried out revolting or harmful activities”, will not be granted access to their country, be they peaceful or violent.
Recalling that the poet Raúl Rivero was sanctioned some months ago to twenty years of prison for literary activities that it seems were considered "revolting and harmful", gives us an idea of the limits of this apparent generosity.
Just as before, it remains in the hands of obscure officials to clarify if the case of any citizen who, situated in another country, desires to visit their homeland, is framed in that way. Besides, that process transpires within the perennial opacity of a system that impedes the identification of who decided to give the order to grant or not, the final stamp.
In the face of an international scandal, the state enjoys the possibility to deny, in a relatively acceptable way, the direct responsibility of the upper level officials in relation to the decision made. The government is able then, if it so desires, to declare its disposition "to rectify an error committed by some remote official of smaller rank" to restore its public image in spite of the fact. In the entire process, the citizens abroad and inside the Island do not have even the smallest control or capacity of monitoring the management of the migratory decisions of its country.
While a Chinese, Vietnamese, Russian, Ethiopian, Iranian, Somali, Guatemalan, Argentine, Mexican or Salvadorian, can sell their possessions to arrive with some money in their future country of settlement —or to return to their home country if the new one does not meet their expectations— the now smoothly labelled "economic Cuban emigrant" is not recognized with those rights and is instead submitted to a unique migratory state in the world, equivalent to that of banishment for life.
If Cuba insists on maintaining a migratory policy of an exceptional and unacceptable nature —save, perhaps, that of North Korea—, it is understandable and can be considered legitimate that the United States maintain a likewise exceptional state of reception for the Cuban emigrants under the Cuban Adjustment Act.
Where it says danger On the other hand, the government of Havana makes multiple use of its migratory policy, courting emigrants that have had the worst luck and everyone that needs to negotiate the possibility of occasionally traveling to Cuba. In exchange for limited access to the country —and at times in exchange for cooperation with the economic or academic institutions of Cuba— silence or collaboration is demanded.
More than a few of those persons —accustomed for decades, before leaving for exile, to believe that it is best "to resolve" personal problems and "not to seek problems"— end up accepting their silence, do not approach Cuban political organizations in exile, or express negative views in the media about these groups without knowing them, including the internal dissidents. In some instances, they also agree to collaborate as informants and agents of the embassies and consulates, against other banished emigrants, be they active oppositionists or not.
The first attitude —to accept not to make statements, not to be involved in activities that make political criticisms of the Cuban state and to maintain cordial relations with the diplomatic Cubans— is often encouraged, sadly, by relatives that were left behind on the Island.
The axiom that holds here is that the Cuban state is going to last a still unforeseeable amount of time and, in the meantime, has the capacity to negatively affect those supposed "emigrants" and their relatives in different ways, if they approach more than is desired by the government of "the exiled". Because of this, some of the relatives that are left in Cuba exhort the emigrants to maintain the same double morale abroad that they had before on the Island, to "not be marked" negatively with the embassies in order to "to be able to continue resolving".
To the most loyal and committed banished-emigrants, or passive exiles from this other sector made up of collaborators and informants, invitations are occasionally distributed to participate in supposed "dialogues" of good will with the Cuban government. These dialogues are nothing but another media show where one of the parties decides the agenda, selects the guests, unilaterally carries out supposed "consultations" and presides over the meetings, without facing the risk of any questioning of the worth —save in exceptional occasions in which a detail escapes the control of the organizers.
Dialogue of the Deaf The organizers do not even include in their agenda humanitarian themes as perceptible as that of the reunification with relatives retained by Havana under various excuses. Nor do they address the exorbitant consular charges and telephone taxes which are imposed by the state or the ultimate revocation of the existing totalitarian migratory system. In the past, decent and honest persons have attended the meetings, excited by the idea of being able to have a public or private conversation that might help to alleviate the serious existing problems; but often —not to say without exception— the official "spectacle” has frustrated their noble aspirations.
For several decades the government in Havana has employed various mechanisms of blackmail to get the mass of the virtually banished Cubans in the exterior to behave with the same double morality that prevails today on the island, resulting in the prolongation in power of the totalitarian political regime that is in charge there.
If the exiled Cubans want the Cubans on the Island to say "no" to the authorities when they are asked to take part in activities of questionable ethics, then they should learn to say "no" when their Consulates and Embassies try to impose an complicit silence, manipulative conduct and limited peaceful political actions in the countries where they now reside.
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